

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ruth

Informal History--US Intelligence Involvement in the East-West Exchanges Program

The official East-West exchanges program had its genesis in the Geneva Summit Conference of mid 1955 when the US and USSR heads of state discussed the possibility of a future exchanges program. Details of the program were worked out late in 1955 during a conference of foreign ministers.

However, the first agreement itself was not signed until January 1958 and covered a two year period as did each subsequent agreement until 1973. The current agreement negotiated last year will remain in effect through 1979. Although informally referred to as "the cultural agreement", the document is properly titled "Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural and Other Fields". The word "contacts" appears for the first time in the current title.

u The period between mid 1955 and January 1958 was taken up with many discussions, arguments perhaps, compromises and resolutions within the Intelligence Community and other areas of the US Government concerning the proper method to handle such a program. This period also saw several informal ad hoc exchanges take place. The most famous was possibly the Soviet Agricultural Delegation which trooped through the Iowa corn fields in 1955. It was shortly after this delegation visit that the White House approached CIA requesting all available intelligence obtained from the delegation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The reporting furnished was the product of Contact Division, CIA. This probably marks the first intelligence involvement in the embryonic exchanges program.

In addition, several individual US scientists were invited to the USSR by private invitation. They happened to be Contact Division sources. Mr. Ashcraft, then Chief/Contact Division, saw in these invitations a unique potential for the collection of foreign positive intelligence (FPI) against the priority target--the USSR. He, therefore, forwarded a memorandum requesting the blessing of the US government in the form of a policy statement on such visits in order that no stigma be attached to the travellers upon their return to the US. This was a real fear of the scientists during that period of cold war.

In June 1956, President Eisenhower approved NSC 5607 authorizing an East-West Exchanges program. The thinking behind it included certain safe guards--security measures for the protection of the US. In brief, the security measures were these:

Intelligence Community advice to State on exchanges

Collection of FPI from US citizens involved in exchanges

Internal security, (counter-intelligence) carried out by
the FBI

By the time 5607 came into being there already existed--and indeed was operating--a mechanism to maximize the intelligence yields from exchanges. This mechanism was the Standing Committee on Exchanges of the Intelligence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Advisory Committee (IAC). The chairman of the Standing Committee was William Bundy; the executive secretary was Guy Coriden, both with CIA at that time. The executive secretariat was established within Contact Division because it was felt that intelligence utilization and exploitation of exchanges was a collection function rather than a research and intelligence production function. Membership at that time included State, Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, CIA, AEC and FBI.

The activities of the Standing Committee were:

- a. advising State of intelligence potential of exchanges proposed by SovBloc or US individuals and groups
- b. suggesting exchange proposals for US initiative. (For it was soon found that the lack of exchange topics approved by the US government weighted the program in favor of the Soviets)
- c. coordination of intelligence interests and activities--exploitation, collection

The activities of the Standing Committee were carefully and thoughtfully limited to the FPI aspects of the program; in other words separated from the internal US security side of the question--counter intelligence--the purview of the FBI. Each side, aware of the actions of the other, established its own channels to the Department of State where, within the Bureau of European Affairs, was set up the future Soviet and Eastern European Exchange Staff (SES) to direct the exchanges program.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In order to keep various government agencies fully informed of developments and to solicit advice, SES held bi-weekly meetings until 1966 with members of the Soviet Desk and Cultural Affairs Bureau of the Department, DOD, Commerce, AEC, USIA, the National Academy of Sciences and CIA. A lengthy status report was published until approximately 1964 or '65 when the volume of visitors rendered such a tabulation impossible.

In Spring 1959 the US Intelligence Board took over the functions of IAC and of the Standing Committee by virtue of DCID 2/6 which remains our charter. Bundy and Coriden simply changed hats and continued their activities now as Chairman of the USIB Committee on Exchanges and Executive Secretary.

In mid 1959 the Department of Commerce expressed its concern over various aspects of the program and its desire to be represented on the USIB committee. The Commerce interest involved its role under the Export Control Act for the control of technical data. DCID 2/6 provided that members from non-USIB agencies could be invited by the chairman as appropriate. Thus, in July 1959, Allen Dulles invited Commerce to be a co-member.

In 1963, another change was in store for the Committee. President Kennedy, feeling that there were too many USIB committees, asked Mr. McCone to review the USIB structure. One of the many to be "disestablished", so the action was termed, was the Exchanges Committee. However, the functions, activities, responsibilities, and membership would remain the same and thus

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the IIAGE, Interagency Intelligence Advisory Group on Exchanges was born. The DCID was rewritten to reflect this change and life continued with one difference. At the request of the military members the Secretariat of the IIAGE became the channel from the services to SES for "military security opinions". A military security opinion simply addresses whether a given visit or itinerary would put a SovBloc visitor into contact with a DOD funded contract. Thus two "opinions" are forwarded to State--the intelligence opinion (weighing of US technological and intelligence loss and gain) and the military security opinion.

Therefore, the Committee, by whatever name, has through the years served as the intelligence advisor to State on all exchange matters. Under DCID 2/6 its main tasks are to maximize the intelligence yield from exchanges and, on the defensive side, to minimize the US intelligence and technological loss within the stated US national policy. These activities continue to the present.

However, today, the Exchanges Agreement is not the only piece of paper outlining activities between the US and USSR. Confusion resulted from the Moscow Summit of May 1972 which marked the signing not only of the new Exchanges Agreement but of several "Agreements on Cooperation" in various fields. The June 1973 Washington Summit witnessed several other "bilaterals" as we have come to nickname them.

The "bilaterals" are ongoing projects, five years in length except for the ten year one on Atomic Energy. Each may include exchanges of delegations, joint symposia, long term exchanges of scientists, and exchanges

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

of technology. The "bilaterals" are in the following fields:

- a. Environmental Protection
- b. Medical Science and Public Health
- c. Exploitation and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
- d. Science and Technology
- e. Agriculture
- f. World Ocean
- g. Transportation
- h. Atomic Energy

Each of the above has an executive agent, i.e. a US government department or agency responsible for the implementation of its bilateral; for example, EPA, HEW, NASA, NSF etc. Thus State's function which was and is one of "direction" under the Exchanges Agreement is more one of "monitoring" under the bilateral program.

Now, most of you are aware of the proliferation of working groups, sub working groups, topics and sub-topics under the various bilaterals. A quick example: The S&T Bilateral can include any S or T area agreed upon by both sides. At the moment it contains some 12 or 13 topics ranging from Microbiology to Science Policy to Use of Computers in Management to Electrometallurgy. Let's take the topic "Energy", one of the original topics of the S&T bilateral. "Energy" has some 8 or 9 sub-topics depending on how you count them. These sub-topics include among others the fields of MHD, solar, and geophysical energy. Each of these sub-topics has a working

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

group. Working groups can have varying numbers of members and may be composed of individuals representing the governmental, academic, and private sectors of the US. A more or less similar structure would exist on the Soviet side. I think you can see the ramifications of this.

In closing, I would like to stress that the long period, mid 55 to January 58, during which the US government discussed, argued, decided and made policy concerning the implementation of an exchanges program, was lacking prior to the signing of the bilaterals. The discussions are happening after the fact. This meeting is part of it, as are the Deputy Assistant Secretary Armitage memorandum to Mr. Nelson; The Admiral de Poix memorandum to the Chairman, USIB; the DOD Ad Hoc Working Group on East West Travel; USIB Human Sources Committee discussions; Intelligence Community Staff concern; Commerce concern on transfer of technology and others. Discussions after the fact are much more difficult.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~